R. Paul Wilson On: Hacking Gadgets and Modern Espionage

Author: R. Paul Wilson

We live in a world that increasingly depends on technology and constantly evolving forms of communication. As gamblers, we are always seeking new ways to play, but modern forms of gaming, such as online casinos, have created opportunities for bad actors to target players. For those of us who frequent these modern platforms, it quickly becomes evident that caution must be exercised online and whenever I spend time with hackers and security experts, I learn about new dangers that are becoming more prevalent in the real world.

Personally, I enjoy a good live casino. While I often play online, a live game offers more entertainment for me with fewer concerns about how money is transferred between the house and my bankroll. Online, however, I am habitually cautious, carefully managing how I pay to play and from which sources I transfer funds. This article is not about these options but about how, even with the greatest care, we could easily lose big in the “getting scammed” lottery if targeted by someone seeking to gain access to our finances.

Modern Scams and Bond-Worthy Tricks

Gamblers are an obvious hacking target if their level of play is high enough and the money flowing through their devices is worth going after. However, we are far from alone in being attractive to the wrong people as potential victims. Investors, travelers, retirees, homeowners, and anyone with means worth stealing can be set up for a sting. Most scams happen online, resulting from wide-net techniques designed to identify and ensnare vulnerable people while filtering out anyone hip to these methods. Essentially, if you’re unwise enough to respond to a phishing attempt, you’re already halfway to getting conned.

Spear-phishing is where scammers target specific marks with tailored stories and methods designed to trick and trap people into potentially dangerous scenarios. Yet, it’s almost always an online con game with no in-person interaction. Street scams and ploys in real life, where a con artist works and manipulates their mark into surrendering something of value, are as rare as they have ever been. However, the methods used are ancient, simply redressed in new stories to suit a modern audience. Hardware hacking combines these approaches, where the live aspect is remarkably simple yet exposes the victim to serious losses if they have been well-profiled and selected.

James Bond fans will remember scenes from movies where the polished vandal-turned-spy would collect the latest gadgets and weapons from “Q-branch.” Here, scientists and engineers collaborated to find the most ingenious or ridiculous solutions to potential problems in the field. This gradually devolved from bug-detecting, powerful magnetic wristwatches to a ludicrous invisible car. However, no great Bond film was complete without a tour through Q’s workshop to see how Her Majesty’s Secret Service might be killing people in the future.

Hacking Tools and the USB Switcheroo

Cheaters and scammers have their own version of Q-branch spread across the dark corners of the internet. Like Bond’s killer gizmos, the hacker’s toolkit is kept secret for as long as possible. Still, ideas leak into the mainstream, and certain devices can become all too easy—and cheap—to deploy compared to much more expensive hardware used by government agencies. One of the most covert tools of surveillance is the “Cottonmouth” cable, a brainchild of the NSA's Advanced Network Technology (ANT) division.

This seemingly ordinary USB cable is anything but; it’s engineered to perform clandestine operations, allowing agents to monitor and manipulate target devices with startling efficiency. Priced at tens of thousands of dollars, its capabilities justify the expense, providing unparalleled access to data streams while remaining virtually undetectable. The “Cottonmouth” cable exemplifies the high stakes and sophisticated nature of modern espionage technology, blending seamlessly into the everyday items we trust and use.

Meanwhile, companies like O.MG sell a lookalike lightning cable capable of doing the same for less than a hundred bucks and market USB dongles that can hack devices for around seventy dollars, which are surprisingly easy to use thanks to this emerging marketplace for attack hardware designed to defeat basic but all-too-common security measures.

Because some of these devices look like familiar items, simply leaving them in the right environment can almost guarantee they will be plugged in by someone. Take the white lightning cable that looks exactly like every cable Apple iPhone users already own: if an attacker leaves this in an office and waits, they will soon receive a message stating the cable has been connected and can then transmit a payload—a series of commands—to the attached laptop or computer.

This powerful device can also employ geo-fencing to identify locations where it should be armed, such as a home or office. Most useful of all to potential hackers, the hardware hidden inside the tiny end of these cables can be instructed to ‘self-destruct’ in order to cover their tracks.

The potential dangers of such hacking devices should be obvious if you simply consider the ways they might be deployed to your own devices with a little social engineering or even sleight of hand. Let’s say you’re a potential target for someone armed with an attack cable. How easy would it be to swap your innocent, legitimate cable for an identical one exposing your actions online? Take a moment to think about that and imagine how you could be scammed into using a compromised accessory like a simple charging cable. You’ll quickly realize opportunities happen all the time.

Chargers, Cables, and Paranoia

Simply leaving your phone plugged in and unattended for a moment would give someone enough time to switch the cable. And what about the charger? Some laptops have large power bricks that could contain all manner of communications devices or insertion software capable of monitoring or operating your computer.

Am I being paranoid? Of course! But creatively, for the purpose of assessing my vulnerability, which starts with whether or not my lifestyle, habits, or career warrant being targeted with attack hardware. Maybe not, but as covert devices become cheaper and easier to find, the required reward-to-effort ratio lowers considerably. Anyone transferring large amounts of money—or gambling—might seem worth targeting by slipping a dodgy cable into their suitcase when they’re not looking.

Having seen the software and hardware demonstrated, I have no doubt this will become a bigger problem for people, especially if this technology is applied at the source for the sake of easier monitoring of ordinary people. How’s that for being paranoid?